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Abstract Protest parties are on the rise in several European countries. This development is
commonly attributed to a growing dissatisfaction with life and associated with declining
quality of life in modern society of the lowest social strata. This explanation is tested in a
cross-sectional analysis of voting and life-satisfaction in 63 districts of the city of Rotterdam
in the Netherlands, where the share of protest voters increased from 10 % in 1994 to 31 % in
2009. Contrary to this explanation protest voting appeared not to be the most frequent in the
least happy districts of Rotterdam, but in the medium happy segment. Also divergent from
this explanation was that average happiness in city districts is largely independent of local
living conditions, but is rather amatter of personal vulnerability in terms of education, income
and health. These results fit alternative explanations in terms of middle class status anxiety.
Keywords Political protest  Happiness  Livability of local environment
1 Introduction
During the last decades a growing number of protest parties has emerged in Western
Europe. This trend started with the rise of ultra right wing parties like the NPD in Ger-
many, the Front National in France and the British National Party in England. Protest
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parties also figure more prominently on the left side of the political spectrum, environ-
mentalist parties in particular. This development has been described at length (e.g., Taggart
1995; Ignazi 1996; Mu¨ller-Rommel 1998; Ignazi 2013) and has been attributed to several
causes, such as the influx of immigrants (Chapin 1997; de Vos and Deurloo 1999),
globalization (Hanley 2001; Leconte 2010), unemployment (Rattinger 1981; Coffe´ et al.
2007), retreat of the welfare state (Anderson 1996; Kriesl 1998) and the rise of meritocracy
(Deegan-Krause 2007).
These societal developments are assumed to result in dissatisfaction which manifests in
protest voting. In that context it is not always clear what the dissatisfaction is about
precisely, about particular social issues or about life as a whole. Term such as ‘unhappy
voters’ (Betz 1993), suggest that protest voting results from dissatisfaction with one’s
personal life, but such suggestions are seldom substantiated empirically and the few studies
that have linked protest voting to happiness did not find much difference (Veenhoven
1988; Klandermans 1989; Social and Cultural Report 2004).
In this paper we contribute to that literature with an analysis of districts in the city of
Rotterdam in The Netherlands. We combined data on (1) average happiness in these
districts, (2) local living conditions, (3) personal vulnerability and (4) protest voting. On
that basis we seek answers to the following questions: (a) Is protest voting more frequent in
the districts where average happiness is lowest? (b) If so, is that lower happiness due to
poor living conditions?, or (c) Is personal vulnerability the most decisive factor behind
both protest voting and unhappiness?
2 Methods
Data were used from the city of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, which city is typical for
West-European cities with a large working class population, a lot of migrants and a
relatively low share of post-modern ‘yuppies’.
2.1 The Case of Rotterdam
With more than 600,000 inhabitants, Rotterdam is the second largest city of the Nether-
lands. During the past decennia major changes have taken place in the composition and
size of the population of Rotterdam. Although the city has been an immigrant town since
the beginning of the industrial revolution, it was originally a white working class town.
From the sixties onwards an influx of migrants from non-western nations has changed the
character of the city drastically. This development was accelerated especially as the more
prosperous indigenous Rotterdammers, say middle class and upper working class, began to
move from the city to its surrounding satellite towns, while the have-nots, i.e. the jobless,
foreign newcomers and poor pensioners remained. At present about half the population is
of non-western origin.
The transition from a typical ‘dockworkers town’ to a more service and education
oriented economy has also had its effects on the size and composition of the population.
The typical social outline of Rotterdam today is that it is a multi-ethnic city with a
relatively poorly educated population, and as a result, a high unemployment rate.
Like in similar West European cities, protest voting has risen sharply in Rotterdam since
the 1990s, as can be seen in Fig. 1, on which we come back later.
740 P. Ouweneel, R. Veenhoven
123
2.2 Data Sources
Data were drawn from different sources: Data on happiness are taken from periodical city
surveys, data on protest voting are taken from elections and data on living conditions in
districts from municipal statistics.
2.2.1 Happiness
Happiness was assessed in periodical city ‘Omnibus’ surveys, which are held every 2 years
among the Rotterdam population since 1997. These surveys contain a large number of
questions on spare time activities, satisfaction with social, cultural and sport provisions and
opportunities, as well as social, ethnical, demographic and economic indicators. They also
contain a question on individual happiness.
2.2.2 Sampling
An a-select sample was drawn from all Rotterdammers aged 13–75 and an extra sample
was drawn of people aged 75 and more. On one aspect the sample was not a-select:
beforehand a fixed number of respondents by borough was determined to reflect the
population of the respective boroughs. Within each borough the sample selection was
a-select. This basic sample also consisted of nonwestern immigrants (Surinam, Antilleans,
Turks, Moroccans and CapeVerdians). These groups were also interviewed in an extra
face-to-face sample. This means that relatively more nonwestern immigrants were ap-
proached than without this face-to-face fieldwork. Because precisely these groups have a
lower response rate the expectation was that this would have a favorable outcome for the
final composition of the response. Despite that in some years an extra sample was drawn
because of the disappointing response rate in those groups.
2.2.3 Response
Over the years the samples have grown to provide more robust samples and to be able to
differentiate between subgroups (see Table 1). The survey has been a paper survey until
2009. In 2009 an internet survey was being held for the first time, this is probably the cause
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Fig. 1 Protest voting in Rotterdam 1994–2009
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for the low response rate that year. Part of the low response rate can be accounted for by
the fact that all forms that were returned empty, for example from people that have moved
or have deceased, are included in the nonresponse. All in all the response rate is not bad for
a city like Rotterdam. The national survey organization CBS for instance contends with a
worse and more selective response in big cities.
When merged, these seven samples provide a dataset of 21,091 cases. We need such a
big number for making a meaningful split-up of the 32 districts in Rotterdam.
2.2.4 Representivity
Representivity was achieved by comparing a number of demographic characteristics of the
sample with those of the population. An extra weight factor was added in order to correct
the skew distribution by borough and age to the population distribution. After weighing the
sample forms a good reflection of the Rotterdam population. Although women, 45? and
natives are a little overrepresented and men, youngsters and some specific ethnic groups
somewhat underrepresented. Furthermore, the response from immigrants from poor
countries is somewhat lower than their population share.
2.2.5 Measure of Happiness
Happiness is the degree to which one judges positively about one’s life-as-whole. This
definition is explained in more detail in Veenhoven 1984: ch. 4, who uses the term
‘happiness’ as a synonym. Thus defined, happiness is something that people have in mind
and consequently it can be measured by simply asking people.
The question used in the Rotterdam city surveys reads: ‘‘Taking all things together, how
happy would you say you are—very happy, happy, not too happy or not happy at all?’’ This
question was first used in the USA (Andrews and Withey 1976) and is still common in
quality of life surveys all over the world.
Validation studies have revealed that the answers to such questions on happiness pro-
duce valid outcomes. People understand what the question is about and respond accord-
ingly. The rate of ‘don’t know’ answers is typically less than 1 % (Veenhoven 1984, ch 3).
Yet reliability is not too good, since the difference between ‘very happy’ and ‘happy’ is not
easy to see and because responses can be tilted by things such as the place of the item in the
questionnaire and the weather in de day of the interview (see Veenhoven 1984). Such
random variations balance out in big samples, so reliability is not a problem in this study.
Table 1 Sample and response in
7 city surveys in Rotterdam
Year N Response rate (%)
1997 1338 33
1999 1665 33
2001 1567 43
2003 1698 28
2005 2962 48
2007 7339 44
2009 4522 20
Total 21,091 33
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2.2.6 Transformation of Scores to Scale 0–10
For ease of presentation we transformed the scores on this 4-point scale into 0 tom 10
school marks, using the following numerical equivalents for verbal response options as
estimated by Veenhoven (1993):
Very happy 9.3
Happy 7.0
Not too happy 4.0
Not happy at all 1.0
2.2.7 Protest Voting
Protest voting in an election demonstrates the caster’s dissatisfaction with main stream
candidates. Protest voting does not necessarily take the form of a valid vote (voice) but can
also take the form of abstention from voting (exit). Voiced protest is typically a vote in
favor of a minority or fringe candidate, either from the far left, far right or self-presenting
of a candidate foreign to the political system (Wikipedia 2014). Protest is also voiced by
‘white’ votes.
In this analysis we measure protest voting both by the percentage of protest votes of all
valid votes and by the percentage of white votes and nonvoters combined. In the analysis
one should bear in mind that the number of white votes is very small in all districts and
don’t even figure marginally compared to the number of nonvoters.
The years of which the election results were analyzed covers the period 1998 to 2009. In
this period all elections held were included: community elections, provincial elections as
well as national elections. The number and names of the protest parties differed between
elections but also between years in which the elections were held. Some parties that
participated in 1998 have disappeared in 2009, while others still did not exist in 1998. The
following parties are regarded as ‘protest party’: NVU, CP’86, CD, SP, Stadspartij,
Leefbaar, LijstFortuijn, TrotsOpNederland, LPF and PVV. Attracting most voters in
comparison to the other protest parties the PVV (Party for Freedom) presents itself as the
party for the ‘common man’ opposed to the political elite. It is furthermore eurosceptic,
anti-islam and anti-immigrant like the other Dutch populist parties that operate in the
margin, with the exception of the SP (Socialist Party) that operates on the left side of the
political spectrum.
The main message of these parties is that they are against the political establishment,
such as nicely illustrated by the poster of the SP party, on which a tomato is thrown. Much
of the protest focuses on the growing number of migrants in the city.
All protest votes were summed and a percentage was calculated on the base of the total
number of valid votes. In 1998 and 1999 the share of protest votes was not very large, but
the share rose to 36.1 % in 2002. This means that 1 out of every 3 votes was on a protest
party.
White voters and nonvoters were computed as a percentage of the total number of
eligible votes, overall this figure was 38 %. Data on voting is available for 63 districts
of Rotterdam. The city counts more districts but districts with less than 75 inhabitants
like industrial sites were left out. The election results were incorporated in the main
database.
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2.2.8 Further Characteristics of Districts
For policy reasons every year since 2007 a ‘Social Index Score’ is computed, which consists
of objective and subjective indicators about the following characteristics of districts:
Vulnerability of inhabitants:
proficiency of the Dutch language
income level
health
education level
Social cohesion:
self perceived social cohesion in the neighborhood
rate of removals in the neighborhood.
Social participation:
involvement in work and school
social contacts
socio-cultural activities
social commitment.
Living environment:
appropriate housing
adequate provisions
absence of discrimination
no pollution and nuisance.
3 Analysis
Having set the scene, we can now answer the research questions mentioned in Sect. 1.
3.1 More Protest Votes in Unhappy Districts?
The first questionwas whether protest voting is a sign of general dissatisfaction with one’s own
life. If so, a ‘happy’ district would count few protest votes. At first sight, the data rather show
the reverse, protest voting being more common in the happier districts. r = ?.34 (p\ .01).
Yet this simple correlation can be misleading, since the votes of migrants may distort
the picture. Remember that about half of the population of Rotterdam consists of immi-
grants with a lower social status, who are unlikely to vote for anti-migrant protest parties.
The zero-order correlation between the % of immigrants and the rate of protest votes in
a district confirmed this: r = -.62 (p\ .001). The correlation between happiness and
nonvoters was similar with r = -.65 (p\ .001).
If the percentage of immigrants in a district is held constant the partial correlation
resulted in the expected direction: rpc = -.31 (p\ .05), meaning that there is a modest
but significant relation between happiness and protest voting. The relation with the per-
centage of nonvoters is even stronger with r = -.40 (p\ .001). This pattern appears more
clearly in the split-up in 3 equal groups presented in Table 2, which shows that the most
and least happy districts have the lowest percentage of protest votes, while in the middle
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‘happy’ category more than 27 % of voters vote on a protest party. An explaining factor
might be that the growth of nonwestern immigrants in this middle group was highest of all
three groups with 33.3 % between 1997 and 2009.
The relation is linear between happiness and white and non-voters: the unhappiest
districts have the highest percentage of nonvoters, followed by the middle and happiest
groups respectively. The reasons for not voting may not only be protest voting but also due
to lack of political commitment and limited understanding of the Dutch language.
When we split the districts by the percentage of protest votes (white and non-votes
excluded), a similar result is found, see Fig. 2. In the group of districts with the lowest
percentage of protest votes, i.e. under 20 %, people are with an average of 6.9 least
happy. But the group which follows, with 20–25 % of protest votes counts the districts
with the happiest inhabitants with an average happiness score of 7.5. But the people in
the districts with the highest percentage of protest votes, more than 30 %, are almost as
happy with 7.4.
We can also approach the relation between happiness and protest votes by splitting the
districts in 4 happiness levels (see Fig. 3). We see a similar nonlinear pattern: the least
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happy districts have the lowest percentage of protest votes (20 %), while the middle
group of ‘reasonably happy’ districts are characterized by the highest percentage of
protest voters (27 %) and in the happiest districts 25 % of the voters vote on a protest
party. Because the correlation between % of protest votes and % of non-western im-
migrants is strongly negative (r = -0.75, p\ .01) we repeated the analysis by con-
trolling the % of nonwestern immigrants. Than the pattern is in the expected direction,
meaning that the least happy districts count the highest percentage of protest votes
(r = -0.44, p\ .01).
Why this non-linear pattern? Close inspection of the Tables 3, 4 reveals that moderate
happiness tends to go with protest voting in two kinds of districts.
Table 2 Happiness, protest voting and immigrants in 63 districts in city of Rotterdam
Mean happiness % Protest votes % White and nonvoters % Immigrants
7.6 22.9 30.3 15.9
7.2 27.4 37.0 22.5
6.8 19.2 46.3 61.4
Table 3 Percentage of protest voters by district
Buurt % Protest Buurt % Protest Buurt % Protest
Spangen 12.8 Struisenburg 22.0 Pernis 27.0
Afrikaanderwijk 13.7 Blijdorp 22.1 Prinsenland 27.3
Feijenoord 13.7 Tarwewijk 22.4 Zevenkamp 27.5
Bospolder 15.3 Schiebroek 22.5 Nieuw Crooswijk 27.6
Tussendijken 15.4 Liskwartier 22.7 Lombardijen 27.7
Hillesluis 15.8 Cool 23.5 Hoogvliet-Zuid 28.1
Schiemond 16.1 Hillegersberg-Noord 23.5 Oud-Mathenesse 28.3
Nieuwe Westen 16.6 Stadsdriehoek 23.8 Zuidplein 28.4
Oude Westen 16.8 Bergpolder 24.4 Carnisse 28.6
Middelland 19.1 Klein Polder 24.7 Ommoord 28.6
Nieuwe Werk 19.5 Hillegersberg-Zuid 24.8 Oosterflank 28.8
Molenlaankwartier 20.1 s-Gravenland 24.8 Zestienhoven 28.9
Kralingen-Oost 20.2 Pendrecht 25.0 Overschie 29.0
Kralingen-West 20.4 Het Lage Land 25.0 Beverwaard 29.2
Delfshaven 20.7 Terbregge 25.1 Groot IJsselmonde 29.3
Kop van Zuid-Entrepot 20.7 Noordereiland 25.4 Zuidwijk 29.6
Provenierswijk 20.8 Hoogvliet-Noord 25.6 Nesselande 31.4
Agniesebuurt 20.9 Rubroek 25.7 Oud IJsselmonde 32.1
Oud Crooswijk 21.6 Kralingesveer 26.6 Wielewaal 33.3
Hoek van Holland 21.8 Katendrecht 26.6 Landzicht 34.6
Oude Noorden 21.9 Oud-Charlois 26.6 Vreewijk 35.7
Bloemhof 21.9 De Esch 26.8 Heijplaat 36.1
Rotterdam 18.3
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3.2 Village-Like Districts
Districts of Rotterdam with a village structure score high on the rankings of protest votes.
The combination of a more closed white community, a safe haven in the big city, with a
vulnerability for immigration of poor immigrants explains why people in these districts
vote on right wing protest parties that promise to keep immigrants out. Often these districts
lie isolated from the rest of Rotterdam, but not always. Examples of these ‘villages’ with
the percentage of protest votes between parentheses are Kralingseveer (26.6 %), Pernis
(27.0 %), Oud-IJsselmonde (32.1 %), Overschie (29.0 %), Wielewaal (33.3 %) and
Vreewijk (35.7 %).
Comparing happiness levels with nonvoters the pattern is again linear, because non-
voters consist also of groups without commitment to politics and groups with not enough
mastery of the Dutch language.
3.3 Threatened Lower Middle-Class Districts
The somewhat more prosperous districts of the lower middle-class are mainly situated in
the outer ring of Rotterdam. The housing distribution of these districts is characterized by a
mix of owner occupied houses and social housing projects. Because of the state subsidies
low income groups have access to this latter category even to the somewhat roomier
Table 4 Mean happiness in 63 districts of Rotterdam
Neighborhood Mean Neighborhood Mean Neighborhood Mean
Nesselande 8.0 Wielewaal 7.2 Rubroek 7.0
Kralingen Oost 7.7 Hillegersberg Noord 7.2 Oud-Mathenesse 7.0
Terbregge 7.6 Groot Usselmonde 7.2 Vreewijk 7.0
Molenlaankwartier 7.5 de Esch 7.2 Kleinpolder 7.0
Blijdorp 7.5 Zevenkamp 7.2 Nieuwe Westen 7.0
Struisenburg 7.4 Schiebroek 7.2 Oud-Charlois 6.9
Hoek v. Holland 7.4 Proven ierswijk 7.1 Oude Noorden 6.9
s-Graven land 7.4 Zuidplein 7.1 Oude Westen 6.9
Overschie 7.4 KopvZuidEntrepot 7.1 Carnisse 6.9
Oud Usselmonde 7.4 Lombardijen 7.1 Tarwewijk 6.9
Pernis 7.3 Bergpolder 7.1 Afrikaanderwijk 6.9
Kralingseveer 7.3 Cool 7.1 Bloemhof 6.9
Stadsdriehoek 7.3 Kralingen West 7.1 Spangen 6.9
Hillegersberg Zuid 7.3 Hilles lu is 7.1 Schiemond 6.9
HoogvlietZuid 7.3 Zuidwijk 7.1 Delfs haven 6.9
Ommoord 7.3 Beverwaard 7.1 Pendrecht 6.9
Heijplaat 7.2 Oosterflank 7.1 Nieuw Crooswijk 6.8
Hoogvliet Noord 7.2 Agniesebuurt 7.1 Feijenoord 6.8
Het Lage Land 7.2 Middelland 7.0 Bos polder 6.8
Liskwartier 7.2 Noordereiland 7.0 Tussendijken 6.7
Prinsenland 7.2 Katendrecht 7.0 Oud Crooswijk 6.7
Rotterdam 7.1
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terraced houses. The consequence is that these originally ‘white’ districts experience a
growing inward flow of nonwestern immigrants. The growth of nonwestern immigrants has
been the highest compared to other districts. Different cultural norms, unemployment and
hence a lack of integration collide with native norms and attitudes, which seems to result in
protest voting of the native population.
3.4 Unhappiness in Districts a Matter of Livability or Life-Ability?
The theory that protest voting comes from unhappiness because of poor living conditions
presumes a strong effect of local living conditions on happiness. Yet another theory holds
that bad districts attract vulnerable people, who do not cope well with life anyway and
would have been equally unhappy in better neighborhoods. Which of these theories fits our
data best?
Vulnerability of inhabitants stands out as the strongest predictor of average happiness of
the four characteristics mentioned in Sect. 2.2. See Table 5. At first sight the zero-order
correlations of each of the district characteristics with happiness are firm. But when
controlled for vulnerability of inhabitants the partial correlations come close to zero and
are all not significant.
One could argue that because of multicollinearity between these variables the zero-order
correlation of vulnerability with happiness (r = ?.91, p\ .01) will also drop to almost
zero when controlled for the other district characteristics. This however is not the case:
When controlled for environment, social cohesion and social participation the partial
correlation between happiness and vulnerability of inhabitants is still firm and significant
with an rpc = ?.45 (p\ .01). So also from this perspective, the path from local liv-
ability ? happiness ? protest voting is small.
4 Discussion
4.1 Explanations
In discussions on societal discontent a common argument is that the have-nots show
their discontentment with the red pencil, i.e., by protest voting. Yet it is not the un-
derclass of modern ‘paupers’ that vote on protest parties, but rather the lower middle
class and upper working class of ‘established’ people who feel threatened in their
Table 5 Correlations of district characteristics with happiness
Characteristics of
districts
Zero-order
correlation with
average happiness
Vulnerability
of inhabitants
partialled out
Environment ?.74* ?.04
Social cohesion ?.55* ?.02
Social participation ?.69* -.14
Vulnerability of inhabitants ?.91*
* p\ .01
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modest prosperity and life style by nonwestern newcomers that came to live in previ-
ously white districts with a mixture of privately owned houses and social housing
projects. These natives are confronted with other cultures and diminishing social co-
hesion, which leads to feelings of alienation. Durkheim’ s anomia theory comes closer
in explaining voting behavior. This explanation fits the wider theory of ‘threatened
middle class’ (e.g., Littrell et al. 2010).
4.2 Limitations
This analysis was done on the level of districts rather than on an individual level, because
data on voting and livability are only available at the district level. A multi-level analysis is
therefore not possible. Still these district level data are richer than could have been ob-
tained with individual level survey data only.
In cross-sectional studies like this there is always the ghost of collinearity on the verge.
When we look for instance at the components of personal capacities: mastery of the Dutch
language, net family income, subjective health and education level, there is collinearity
with the % of nonwestern immigrants, with well to do and poor neighborhoods and even
with health.
The focus of this research was on local government and happiness. This means that the
outcome of this study cannot be generalized to a national level. Local conditions are not the
same as national political topics.
5 Conclusion
Protest voting cannot be attributed to general dissatisfaction with life in modern society,
but draws on more specific problems over which local policy makers have some control.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
Appendix
Aspects of livability in 63 districts in city of Rotterdam
All rated on scale 0–10
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